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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Lundahl argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record 
on appeal with a transcript of the probation violation hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and 
the probation disposition hearing, held on August 31, 2010. Mr. Lundahl argues that the 
requested transcripts are necessary for his appeal because the district court could 
utilize its own memory of the prior proceedings when it executed a sentence after 
relinquishing jurisdiction. In response, the State argues that the only relevant transcript 
is the one from the rider review hearing based on the new standard of review articulated 
in State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012). 
This brief is necessary to address the Morgan Opinion and the State's assertion 
that the requested transcripts are not relevant to the issues on appeal. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.4-12.) Mr. Lundahl argues that the requested transcripts are relevant because 
a district court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings when it makes a 
sentencing decision. Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an independent review of 
the entire record when determining whether a district court abused its discretion in 
regard to a sentencing determination, what was specifically presented to the district 
court at a rider review hearing does not define the scope of review concerning the 
sentencing issue. The only questions are: whether the information at fssue was before 
the district court at any of the prior hearings, and whether that information is relevant to 
the sentencing issues on appeal. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Lundahl could only challenge 
the denial of his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion as the notice of 
appeal was timely from that order but not from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.12-14.) Mr. Lundahl then filed a motion seeking clarification of 
appellate jurisdiction with the Idaho Supreme Court and asserted that his notice of 
appeal was timely from the order relinquishing jurisdiction per the prison mail box rule. 
(Motion for Order Clarifying Jurisdiction of Supreme Court and to Suspend Briefing 
Schedule Pending Court's Ruling and Affidavit in Support Thereof, pp.1-5.) Thereafter, 
the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order stating that Mr. Lundahl's notice of appeal 
was timely filed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (Order, p.1.) 
Otherwise, the statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Lundahl's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Lundahl due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?1 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Lundahl's I.C.R. 35 
motion requesting leniency? 
1 This issue was addressed in the Statement of Facts, supra. Otherwise, issues II and 
Ill will not be addressed in this brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Lundahl Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making 
sentencing decisions. Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho 
appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive 
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record 
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in 
regard to a sentencing determination. In other words, the question on appeal generally 
does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered. Instead, the 
central question is whether the record before the district court supports its sentencing 
determination. 
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was 
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing 
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of 
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of 
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which 
were never discussed by the district court and occurred years before the disposition of 
the issue on appeal. 
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B. In The Event This Case Is Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, The Court Has 
The Authority To Address The Issues Raised In The Appellant's Brief 
1. The Idaho Rules Of Appellate Procedure Require The Idaho Court Of 
Appeals To Address The Issues Raised In Mr. Lundahl's Appeal 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Lundahl argued, for the first time in this appeal, that 
the denial of his request for the transcripts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process and equal protections clauses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-17.) In response, the 
State argued, based on State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), that the Court 
of Appeals does not have the authority to address Mr. Lundahl's due process argument 
because it would be tantamount to entertaining an appeal from the Supreme Court. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Contrary to the State's assertion, Idaho Appellate Rule 
108 requires the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of all cases to which it is 
assigned by the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 108 state as follows: 
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and 
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the 
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases: 
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho 
Supreme Court; 
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in 
criminal cases; 
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission; 
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission; 
(5) Review of the recommendatory order$ of the Board of 
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar; 
(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council. 
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(emphasis added). Since the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief do not fall into any of 
the foregoing categories, the Idaho Court of Appeals has the authority to address the 
issues raised in his Appellant's Brief. 
Further, an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an 
implicit grant of authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review Mr. Lundahl's claims 
about the constitutionality of the merits of its decision to deny his request for the 
transcripts. The Supreme Court will be aware of Mr. Lundahl's due process issue when 
it makes it decision to either keep this appeal or assign it to the Court of Appeals. This 
position is bolstered by the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. Specifically, I.R.S.C. 
21, which governs the assignment of cases. The language of I.R.S.C. 21 follows: 
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the 
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the 
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to 
reconsider the assignment. 
Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing 
and circulated to all the justices. 
At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be 
taken up at conference. 
The assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the rule, it is a 
deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and provide input 
into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court will be aware of Mr. Lundahl's due process and equal protection arguments when 
it makes the decision to either keep this case or assign this case to the Court of 
Appeals. In the event this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court 
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will be implicitly granting the court authority to address the merits of Mr. Lundahl's 
claims of error. 
Additionally, the State implicitly asserted that Mr. Lundahl should file a renewed 
motion to augment the record with the Court of Appeals in the event this case is 
assigned to the Court of Appeals. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) This assertion is 
without merit because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed with the 
Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall be 
no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Mr. Lundahl is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to an 
appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 110 
expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the State's contention that Mr. Lundahl 
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could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is 
contrary to the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
In sum, when the Idaho Supreme Court assigns an appeal to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, the Idaho Appellate Rules require the Court of Appeals to decide all issues 
addressed in that appeal. Even though Mr. Lundahl is challenging the constitutionality of 
the Supreme Court's decision to deny his request for the transcripts, an assignment of 
this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an implicit grant of authority from the 
Idaho Supreme Court to review all issues raised in the Appellant's Brief. 
2. An Assignment Of This Case to An Appellate Tribunal With No Authority 
To Address Mr. Lundahl's Claims Of Error V\/ill Violate His Right To 
Procedural Due Process On Appeal 
In the event the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this case to the Court of Appeals 
and it determines that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address all of 
the issues Mr. Lundahl's raised in his appellant's brief, he argues, in the alternative, that 
will function as a separate denial of his federal due process rights, which guarantee him 
a fair appeal. The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee 
a criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; ID Const art. 1 
§ 13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
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State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132 
Idaho 1, 227 (1998). 
While there is no federal guarantee to an appeal from criminal state court 
proceedings, after a state decides to provide appellate review, the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable during the 
entirety of the appellate proceedings. Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). In Idaho, 
a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See I.C. § 19-2801. An 
appeal from an order relinquishing jurisdiction is an appeal of right as defined in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 11. "Relief from . . . [an order relinquishing jurisdiction] may 
appropriately be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 754 n.1 
(Ct. App. 1993). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an 
appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 
891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 
is an appealable order pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(6)). 
In this case, Mr. Lundahl argues that due process protections apply to every 
stage of his appeal. Those protections apply to any appellate procedural decision made 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Even though Mr. Lundahl does not have an independent 
right to appeal from the order denying his motion to augment, he can challenge the 
constitutionality of the order because it is a procedural component of his appeal and 
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to all procedures affecting his 
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appeal. If the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals, 
knowing that the Court of Appeals had no authority to reverse an order of the Supreme 
Court, a unique and independent procedural due process violation will occur because 
the Supreme Court will have precluded Mr. Lundahl from any state procedure by which 
he could raise his federal constitutional claims challenging the denial of his motion to 
augment. 
C. The New Standard Of Review Articulated in Morgan Is lnapposite As It Did Not 
Alter The Standard Of Review Applicable When An Appellant Challenges The 
Length Of A Sentence Which Is Executed After The Revocation Of Probation 
The State argues that the requested transcript is not necessary for this appeal in 
reliance on the new standard of review articulated in Morgan. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) 
However, the Morgan standard of review is only applicable to the question of whether 
probation should be revoked and not to the question of what is an appropriate sentence. 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 2009), made it clear what standard of review 
is applicable when the question on appeal is what the appropriate sentence should be 
executed. Morgan is inapposite as Mr. Lundahl is challenging the length of his 
sentence on appeal. 
The Court of Appeals' standard of review which is relevant to the length of a 
sentence which is executed following the revocation of probation was articulated in 
Hanington. In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals resolved an ongoing dispute about 
the proper standard of review in probation revocation cases. Id. at 27. Relying on 
State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 
392 (Ct. App. 1992), the State sought to limit review to only facts that had arisen 
between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation proceedings. 
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Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Essentially, the State's position would have eliminated any 
need for appellate courts to review the change of plea hearing transcript, the sentencing 
transcript, and the presentence report because all of that information would have been 
available to the district court prior to the original sentencing hearing. See id. Hanington 
argued that the proper standard of review should include a review of "all facts existing 
both at the time of the original sentence and at the time the sentence is ordered into 
execution," relying on the standard established in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 
1055-1056 (Ct. App. 1989). Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hanington and 
stated: 
Id. 
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review 
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited 
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and 
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we 
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation. 
The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to 
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the 
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal. 
The rationale behind this clarification makes perfect sense when looking to State v. 
Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire 
record when reviewing the executed sentence: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
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of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. As such, when an appellant challenges the length of 
his/her sentence, the applicable standard of review requires an independent and 
comprehensive inquiry to the events which occurred prior to as well as the events which 
occurred during the disposition of the matter at issue. The basis for this standard of 
review is that the judge "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of 
events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. Based on that 
presumption, the Court of Appeals stated that, "When reviewing that decision, we 
should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the district 
court must expressly reference the prejudgment events in order for this standard of 
review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals assumed the judge 
will automatically consider the prejudgment events when determining whether to 
execute or reduce a sentence. 
The State also argues, in reliance on Morgan, that Mr. Lundahl was not denied 
due process because he could have filed an objection to the record in order to get the 
requested transcript. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) In deciding whether Morgan's 
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rights were violated, the Court of Appeals held that because he could have obtained the 
transcript without question during the objection to the record phase, he is precluded 
from augmenting with those transcripts at a later stage in the appellate proceedings. 
Morgan, 153 Idaho at .621-622. However, this ignores the procedure the Idaho 
Supreme Court has adopted and made available to all appellants to obtain transcripts 
that are needed to complete the appellate record. See I.AR. 30. Idaho Appellate Rule 
30 provides in part, 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. Such a motion 
shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the specific grounds for 
the request and attaching a copy of any document sought to be 
augmented to the original motion and to two copies of the motion which 
document must have a legible filing stamp of the clerk indicating the date 
of its filing, or the moving party must establish by citation to the record or 
transcript that the document was presented to the district court. Any 
request for augmentation with a transcript that has yet to be transcribed 
must identify the name of the court reporter(s) along with the date and title 
of the proceedings(s), and an estimated number of pages, and must 
contain a certificate of service on the named reporter(s). 
Through this procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has allowed all parties to obtain 
transcripts that need to be a part of the appellate record. If one must have completed 
the appellate record by the time of the settlement stage under rule I.AR. 28, then there 
would be absolutely no need to have I. A R. 30. Idaho Appellate Rule 30 is there to 
ensure every opportunity is given to provide a completed record to the appellate court. 
As recognized in State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 656 (Ct. App. 2004), the appellant could 
ask to complete the appellate record by fifing a motion under I.AR. 30 to augment the 
appellate record with the necessary missing transcripts. 
Additionally, the State argues that Mr. Lundahl's arguments about State v. 
Warren, 123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App. 1992), constitute either a "misrepresentation" by 
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appellate counsel or a "misunderstanding" of the Warren Opinion because in Warren 
the Court affirmed due to a lack of a more complete record and did not presume the 
lack of irrelevant transcripts supported the district court's sentencing determination. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Lundahl neither 
misrepresented nor misunderstood the holding in Warren. In Warren, Mr. Warren was 
convicted of aggravated battery in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. 
Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the district court retained jurisdiction for 
180 days. Id. After completing the period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was 
placed on another period of probation, which was ultimately revoked. Id. The district 
court then sua sponte reduced the length of Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren 
then appealed and alleged that the district court should have further reduced the length 
of his sentence. Id. In support of that position, Mr. Warren argued that his probation 
violation was trivial. Id. In response to this argument the Court of Appeals held as 
follows: 
Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the probation violation by 
arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the nature of 
the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren 
bit off his victim's ear. In regard to the character of the offender at the time 
of the battery, the only fact in the record we have been presented on 
appeal is that Warren had a drug problem. Warren "bears the burden of 
presenting a record sufficient" for us to evaluate the merits of his claim. 
State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451, 453, 757 P.2d 714, 716 (Ct.App.1988) 
(citing State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936, 694 P.2d 400 (Ct.App.1984). The 
record on this appeal fails to contain the presentence investigation report 
or transcript from the sentencing hearing on the battery conviction. 
Without a more complete record and no argument by Warren as to why 
the sentence was unreasonable we affirm the court's decision to reduce 
his aggravated battery sentence to three years' fixed with ten years' 
indeterminate. We also affirm the order denying the Rule 35 motion with 
respect to this sentence. 
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Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Lundahl recognizes that the Warren Opinion does not use 
the word "presumption," but that distinction is inapposite when the cases cited by the 
Court of Appeals in the foregoing quote are reviewed. For example, the Warren Cowi 
cited to State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984), which held as follows: 
The burden of showing that the original sentence was unduly severe is 
upon the moving party. When a discretionary decision related to 
sentencing is challenged on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of 
presenting a sufficient record to evaluate the merits of the challenge. E.g., 
State v. Wolf, 102 Idaho 789, 640 P.2d 1190 (Ct.App.1982). Here, the 
record is fatally incomplete. It does not contain the original sentence, the 
presentence report (if any) or a transcript of any proceedings related to the 
original sentence. The record consists primarily of Rundle's motion, the 
district court's order, and an affidavit, accompanied by a memorandum, 
stating reasons for the relief sought. These reasons are largely limited to 
averments that Rundle has learned his lesson about obeying the law, that 
he has complied with regulations at the Idaho State Correctional Institution 
and that further confinement would ill serve his rehabilitation or the welfare 
of his family. 
Id. at 937-38 (emphasis added). Rundle was cited in another Court of Appeals case, 
State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 1993). In that case, Mr. Fortin filed an Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. Id. at 327-23. In support of his motion, 
Mr. Fortin wanted to submit testimony from a person who was with him on the night of 
his offense. Id. at 328. The Court of Appeals made the following holding concerning this 
proposed testimony: 
Fortin stated in his motion that he wished to present the testimony 
of Darin Walker, who was Fortin's passenger the night of the accident. 
Fortin did not, in his motion or by affidavit, inform the district court what the 
substance of Walker's testimony would be. This Court will not disturb the 
district courtrs discretionary decision without any evidence that the 
proffered testimony was relevant. Fortin bore the burden of presenting a 
sufficient record to allow judicial evaluation of the merits of his Rule 35 
motion. State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936, 937, 694 P.2d 400, 401 
(Ct.App.1984); State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 839 P.2d 1244 
(Ct.App.1992). Having failed to make such a record, Fortin has not shown 
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that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion without 
admitting Walker's testimony. 
Id. (emphasis added). In both Rundle and Fortin, the Court of Appeals held that it 
would not review the merits of an appellate claim of error in the event the appellant fails 
to provide an adequate record for review of that issue. As such, Mr. Lundahl was not 
misrepresenting or misunderstanding the holding of Warren, when he argued that "the 
Warren Opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's 
decision to execute the original sentence," had Mr. Lundahl failed to request the 
transcript at issue.2 While the cases do not use the phrase "presumed to support the 
original sentencing decision," Warren, Rundle, and Fortin all hold that an appellate claim 
of error will not be addressed on the merits in the event the appellant fails to provide an 
adequate record to review the issue. 
The State also argues that the requested transcript was never presented to the 
district court and, therefore, was never part of the record before the district court and 
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 11.) 
Contrary to the State's position, the question of whether the transcripts of the requested 
proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation violation 
disposition hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are relevant to the 
issues on appeal. That is because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district court is 
2 Subsequent opinions have refined this standard. ·For example, in State v. Coma 133 
Idaho 29 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals held, "[i]t is well established that 
an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate . 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422 
(Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 
108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985), and where pertinent portions of the record are 
missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court. State v. 
Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 (Ct. App. 1992)." Id. at 34. 
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not limited to considering only that information offered at the proceeding from which the 
appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own 
official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 
2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings 
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the 
trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon 
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the 
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. 
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case 
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about 
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearing was transcribed or not is 
irrelevant, because the district court could rely upon the information it already knew from 
presiding over the hearings at issue. Moreover, in Adams, supra, the Court of Appeals 
presumed that the district court would rely upon such information and, therefore, 
needed transcripts of the prior proceedings to consider the same facts presumptively 
utilized by the district court. 
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a 
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new 
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty 
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide 
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a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something 
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id. 
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a 
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an 
appeal is filed from a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. Further, if that is new 
information, a district court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at 
sentencing when evaluating a Rule 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 
451, 452-453 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits 
of an appeal from the denial of an Rule 35 motion because the appellant failed to 
provide the PSI and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record. See 
also State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984). 
In sum, the Morgan Opinion only dealt with an appeal challenging the district 
court's decision to revoke probation. Hanington still controls the applicable standard of 
review when a sentence is challenged on appeal. As such, the requested transcripts 
are relevant to the sentencing issue raised on appeal, and lack of access to those 
transcripts will prevent Mr. Lundahl from a merits based review of his sentencing issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues whict1 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Lundahl 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district 
court to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Lundahl respectfully requests that 
this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence. 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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